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A CENTURY OF PLATONIC SCHOLARSHIP IN FRANCE:

FROM COUSIN TO ROBIN

The hintory of modern Platonic scholarohip in France
begins with Victor Counin.
Deccartcs, proud of the method which he had invented,
had refused to acknowledge any indebtedness to ancient or medi
evil predecessors.
Yet already some of his immediate followers
attempted to reconcile Cartesian thinking with earlier philo
sophical traditions.
In this process an important role was
played by members of the congregation of the Oratorians which
was founded by Descartes' friend:
the cardinal Berulle.
The
basis of the synthesis of the Oratorians was the Christian
philosophy of St. Augustine and3 just as Augustinianism had been
one of the main channels of Platonic and Nee-platonic thought
in the Middle Ages, it played a similar role in the writings of
Some of the most sympathetic and most original
the Oratorians.
examinations of Plato's philosophy in 17th century France were
made by members of this congregation, while the Jesuits fre
quently rejected Platonism and defended the Aristotelianism of
the scholastics.
The paramount problem for the Oratorians as well as for
other Catholic thinkers--such as Bossuet--who were attracted by
Plato, was to point out the ag�eement of the Platonic philosophy
with basic doctrines of the Church.
The growth of secularism
in the 18th century reduced the importance of this problem
considerably.
But only in exceptional cases did secularism
The main trends of 18th
p romote an independent study of Plato.
It be
century philosophy were hostile to transcendentalism.
came a custom to call Plato's philosophy chimerical.

•

Cousin's significance is due to his extra-ordinary
sensitivity to intelJ.ectual currents.
In the early years of the
Restoration per1od3 I't,me. de Stael directed the attention of the
French public toward the recent events in the intellectual life
of Germany.
Cousin, who had been first attracted by Scotch
thinkers like Reid, soon sensed the greater power of Kant and
the post-Kantian idealists.
I have to deal briefly with a
difficult and controversial subject.
It seems to me evident
that the young Cousin was deeply attracted by the speculations
of Schelling and Hegel and that, at the first contact, he
responded like a congenial disciple.
In 1817, 1818 and 1824,
Cousin visited Germany.
He visited Goethe; he had long and
intimate discussions with both Schelling and Hegel as well as
with Creuzer, Bekker, Brandis and others; he also met Schleier
macher.
After his return to France he remained in contact with
many of these persons.
In the earlier years of his career Cousin freely acknow
ledged his indebtedness to Germany.
Later he became more
hesitant to do so.
One of his biographers suggests that Cousin
owed much to German philological and historical scholarship but
little to German philosophy.
I do not believe that one can
separate the two, and Cousin's merits about Plato seem to me
to confirm this view.
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-3to whom I am attached most closely is Plato.11
But Plato, himself'
as the above quotation shows, was understood by him as a spiri
tualist like Leibniz and the Neo-platonists.
In his later yearsJ Cousin tried to show that Platonic
idealism is the true tradition of French philosophy since Des
cartes.
11'11he concept of the infinite to Descartes means the
same as the universal, i.e. the idea, means to Plato. 11
Male
branche, Bossuet, Fenelon, he asserts, belong to the same
tradition.
"Bossuet quotes St. Augustine, he quotes Plato
himself, he defends him from the outset against those who convert
the Platonic ideas into some being that subsists by itself,
whereas in reality they only exist in the mind of God. 11
(Du
Vrai, du Beau et du Bien).
Here it is evident that Cousin'S
Platonism:rn-the end--wa8° a revival of Augustinianism.
For half
a century this eclectic Augustinianism became the dominant trend
among French interpreters of the Platonic philosophy, even though
there were a few powerful dissenters.
For the year 1833 the Academie des Sciences Morales et
Politiques had announced a prize for the best essay on the
Metaphysics of Aristotle.
On the suggestion of Cousin the first
pr1ze-wassplit between the German scholar Michelet and the young
Frenchman Ravaisson.
Cousin had not been partial to Plato in
the sense that he should have played out Plato against Aristotle.
Ravaisson we.fJ a fervent Aristotelian who in his work tried to
point out the superiority of the Stagirite over his master.
Ravaisson was deeply influenced by Maine de Biran and
by Schelling and he shared the latter's hostility to Hegel.
It
seems that he believed that there was a far reaching similarity
between Hegel and Cousin and again between Hegel and Plato.
Thus
it is likely that his analysis of the Platonic philosophy re
flects his conception of those whom he considered as Plato's
modern successors, i. e. Hegel and Cousi11.
However that may be,
for the history of the Platonic studies in France it is relevant
that Ravaisson included in his work on Aristotle a lengthy
discussion of the Platonj.c philosophy and that this discussion
was unsympathetic toward Plato.
Ravaisson's work on Aristotle's Metaphysics is a major
major event i:ri -�he rJstcry of class.ical -iic!:"rioJ:ai-.�snip·.
Fr(;nch
Platonists felt the C'.�1aJlenge to counter it w]th a posii��ve work

on Plato cf equal i�p��t.
I believe that no work Met the challengE
before Leon Robin's book on Plato's Doctine of Numters and Ideas
that appea�'"'cd ;i.968.
·--

----··----

---

·

Ravaisson ob.jects to the Platonic philosophy,

because he

thinl::s it is a pL1rely abst�:act doctr�.nc ar:d thc�.t in::.itead of
lead:i.ng toward real:!. t.y it leads away from it.
His c:eiticism is
directed both against Plato's dialectics and against the theory
of ideas.

Ravaisson's concept of dialectics depends on Aristotle's
use of the term.
Dialectics is a method to dissolve sophisms

-4but scarcely transcends the level of sophistic argument itself.
What is worse, it is the purpose of this dialectics "to re

discover an element of generality in the individual existences
and to reduce the sensible diversity to the rational unity of the

Yet Plato 1s tendency toward abstraction founders,
universal.
11
when it looks for a supreme unity, for
there is no genus which
simultaneously comprises all objects of thought, all categories
A meaningful logical order presupposes concepts
of existence.11
that are adapted to the particular forms of being instead of
abstractions which are emptied of every content.
The theory
of ideas is an ontology based on dialectical abstraction and
leads to a meaningless duplication of reality.
11

The starting point of Ravaisson's own philosophy is the
self-consciousness of the active soul which never simply cognizes
but which simultaneously thinks, loves, acts and infuses life,
It is within this
thought, love and creativity into nature.
context that he renewed Aristotle1s arguments against the theory

of ideas.
The resulting picture of Plato's abstractionism is
obviously but a caricature, yet this caricature was so force

fully drawn that French Platonists for many years were at pains
to point out its distortions.
As most of these apologies of Plato originated in the
school of Cousin, it was for their authors even more disturbing
when a herE:Gy started in their own midst.
In 1841, i.e. four
years after the appearance of the first volume of Ravaisson's
Aristotle in its final shape, 11.1. Henri Martin published a
critical text, a translation and a commentary on the Timaeus

in tvm volumes.
In this work, which was dedicated toCousin,
the author attacked the very foundation of the eclectic
Platonism, i.e. the Augustinian view which placed the ideas
In his own thinking, Martin was a spirit
in the divine mj_nd.
ualist and he maintained with much conviction that there is but
one substance which is God and that, accordingly, there is no

separate existence cf ideas outside of him.
But Martin was
just as definite in ass.srting that this view which he personally

defended was not the doctrine of Plato.
Plato indeed considered
Martin does not conceal his
the ideas as independent entities.
disappointment about thj.s fact, as, otherwise, he is full of
ad�iration for Plato and defends him against Ravaisson.
If,

for instance, the latter had echoed Arlototle's charge that
Plato was ignoyiant of the concept of the final cause, Ma.rtin

argues that in spite of Plato's failure to create a consistent
philosophical system wh·�ch made it, e. g., impossible to
determine the relation of the demiurg to the idea of the good,
certain passages of the Republic definitely suggest that the idea
of the good exercises thE�functTon cf a final cause.
Aristotle,
he charges, used to prefer those interpretations of the words of
his teacher which were most open to criticism.

Martin lacks the philosophical originality which makes
Ravaisson one of the important thinkers of the nineteenth cen
tury,

but he surpasses Ravaisson

(at least the Ravaisson of the
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-7everything participates in thought; but now it is the divine
thought where subject and object, the intelligible and the
intelligence, are re-traced to identity, embrace existence and
knowledge and thus make mutual participation possible."
The
sequence of this thinking still reflects Cousin's transition
from psychology to ontology.
Asserting that Plato "proved" the doctrine of ideas
and listing the arguments as they were reported by Aristotle,
Fouillee mainly pursues the 11one over the many, 11
Emphasizing
the significance of the Parmenides (as against the Timaeus)
Fouillee claims that Plato lookSfor middle terms (mo;ver1stermes)
whenever he is confronted with opposites as these middle terms
represent the unison of the extremes.
In the end the search for
the unifying principle leads to the supreme one which embraces
On the other hand there cannot be an
all ideas potentially.
absolute division between ideas and material things, since then
ideas would only be known by the divine mind and material things
only by men (Parm 132 f). Fouille'e concludes that the doctrine
of participation as developed in the Pa:cmenides and the Sophist
entirely obliterates the chorismos bet""i"veen:·· thetwo realms--an
opinion which was to be shared by scholars who otherwise had
little in common with the spiritualistic interpretion.
In the last part of his work, Fouillee draws several
conclusions about the unexpressed assumptions of the Platonic
The highest principle, underlying Plato's thought
philosophy.
is, according to this interpreter, the faith in the rationality
of being and in its universal intelligibility.
He calls this a
synthetic principle.
Not being demonstrable, the belief in
the intelligibility of being is an act of our will, our freedom.
Fouill&e mai�tains, however, that our freedom must choose this
faith, because it represents the good, the love-worthy,
11P;J..ato
seems to have understood that the act of the metaphysical faith
in the idea of ideas is a moral deed of love.
To believe in
the good is not only reasonable, it is even good.11
Fouill�e's use of the terms:
will, freedom, choice, the
distinction between ·what is known and ·what is to be assumed
suggests that even at the time when he wrote his bool{; on Plato,
he had already absorbed other philosophical currents beside the
eclectic spiritualism,
It is probably due to such influences
that his enthusiasm for Plato soon gave way to a more reserved
attitude and even to sharp criticism. In his later History of
Philosophy he reproaches Plato for having presented his meta
physical speculations as knowledge and not as poetic hypotheses.
Plato's God now appears to him as an ideal whose existence has
not been demonstrated.
What is worse, this unproven God is
perfection and not goodness, and Plato's ethics ignores the
personal will, human freedom and benevolence.
,

Fouillee's personal development reflects a change in
the intellectual climate of France.
About the middle of the
nineteenth century the philosophical scene had been entered by
two philosophers neither of whom had been a student at the

-8I

Universite or th e Ecole Normale or was ever to hold a chair
of philosophy; Auguste Comte and Charles Renouvier.
In the
case of Comte, the influence of his philosophy, too, was most
strongly felt outside the universities, but Renouvier·, since
about 1870, exercised a strong influence on the thinking of the
younger teachers of philosophy.
Even more important for the
present context is the fact that Comte had little to say about
Plato--and that little was critical if not hostile--and that
Renouvier had early presented a thoughtful interpretation of
Plato's philosophy in a Manual of Ancient Philosophy (1842).
But the decisive turn off{enouvier 1 s thought took place in the
He now became
years following the publication of the Manual.
a decided opponent of eclecticism and called his new endeavor
criticism, thus indicating that he wanted to renew and to
continue the work of Kant.
r.rhe given material from which Renouvier's analysis
started was called by him representation and this he took both
But instead of an induction from
as process and as product.
psychology to ontology, Renouvier insisted on a rigorous logical
analysis.
After the model of Kant but with important modifi
cations, Renouvier put up a table of categories with"relation"
taking the place of a basic category.
Like Kant he referred
the categories to the for·ms of judgment.
Every judgment in
volves composition and decomposition (synthesis and analysis).
11
A is B, 11 A and B are differentiated as two
In the judgment
concepts which have their own definitions.
The copula on the
other hand shows that there is something common between the two
and so, from a certain point of view they are also identified.
1'Thus the positing of the re lation
. brings about a deter
mination in that it differentiates and distinguishes.
Whence it
follows that relation . . . is a synthesis of the other and the
11
(T cait� �� LobSi�ue q enerale, 2nd ed., p. lZIB)
same.
_
. ..

•

.

:

It seems to me probable that in this analysis Renouvier
was consciously or unconsciously influenced by Plato's dis
cussion of the "most important Forms i; in the Sophist which he
himself had analyzed in the Manual, and that 'Chis analysis, in
turn, was to influence both Fouillee's and Brochard's inter
pretations of Plato:s dialectics.
But Renouvier's criticism
excluded any ontological conclusion from the content of our
consciousness to a divine mind.
There is no legitimate
passing from Tienouvier's criticism to the Augustinianism of the
eclectics.
Fouillee in his work on Plato disregarded Renouvier's
caveat whereas for Brochard and the later interpreters August
inianism was a doctrine of the past.
The center of Renouvier's philosophy is the conscious
ness of freedom.
As far as the judgment is concerned he
maintained that only freedom makes it possible to distinguish
For the determinis� truth and error are
truth from error.
equally necessary.
Freedom, on the other hand means the
possibility to doubt and to subject our judgment to reason
instead of the affections.

J

-9"Error is freedom!"
Deeply impressed by the teachings
of Renouvier, Victor Brochard, in his early book On Error (1879)
discussed the theories of error of Plato, Descartes and 'Spinoza.
Descartes is closest to his own voluntarism, Spinoza is farthest
away from it..
Plato stands between the two.
Analyzing the
pertinent passages of the Theaetetus and the Sophist, Brochard
praises Plato for· having recognized-that error· is not located
in the object but in the judgment and that it is a synthesis.
This means, he asserts, that error is not only the absence of
truth but is something positive that is different from the
truth.
But the difference between truth and error is derived
by Plato from the idea of the good, and the idea of the good is
only an idea.
Plato's intellectualism fai1s to see that error
presupposes an 11active spontaneity, 11 in order that it can deviate
For 11the existence V\h ereby the possible differs
from the truth.
11
from the real is not itself idea or intelligence but is will.

(p. 41)

Brochard's next and his most accomplished book was the
(1887),
This work shows that
Brochara-Was-ro
l t only greatly indebted to the philosophy of
Renouvier (in this book again he develops a thesis of his master)
ru.t that he had also absorbed and fully mastered the methodolo
gical advances in the interpretation of ancient philosophy that
had been made by German scholars.
The year 1870 brought about a
profound change in the attitude of French intellectuals toward
It finally destroyed the image created by Mme. de
Germany.
Stael of a nation which only aspired to excel by its philosophy
and poetry.
On the other hand it challenged French scholars to
show that they were second to none in those fields in which
Brochard's book on the an
Germany had played a leading role.
cient sceptics is but one of the successful answers to this
challenge.
famous Lou SceptiQues Grecs

For Brochard himself, his study of one of the Hellenistic
schools of philosophy resulted in a new conception of the charac
ter of ancient philosophy which also infl�cncod his understanding
of the Platonic philosophy.
This conception is evident from a
number of essays in which he pointed out that (1) the ethics of
the eclectics was greatly dependent on Kant's moral philosophy,
especially in its insistn.nce on duty; (2) that Kant's concept
of duty is basically not a philosophical but a religious con
cept, reflecting the biblicaJ. notion of a God who makes command
ments; that a genuine philosophical ethics, as exemplified by
the true Greek philosophy, is eudaemonistic.
Within the con
text of Plato's ethics, Brochard is mainly interested in the
theory of pleasure.
Plato (like Aristotle) is for him an
advocate of metriopatheia which he personally preferred to the
rigorism of Stoic ap&theia.
In other words, Brochard does not
try so much to understandPlato on the background of his pre
decessors as he comprehends him on the basis of a general con
cept of ancient philosophy which reflects Hellenistic attitudes
along with ancient Hellenic ones.
This concept of ancient
philosophy is opposed both to the eclectic ethics with its
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insistence on duty and the categorical imperative and to the
claim that the eclectic ethics if fundamentally identical
with Plato's.
Discussing Plato's dialectics, Brochard was deeply aware
of the intellectual effort which was needed to overcome the
logical rigorism of Parmenides.
It was certainly paradoxical
to recognize the being of non-being, and in doing so Plato
did not proceed logically but dialectically; i.e. he first
analyzed the difficulties of being itself.
At this point it
was decisive which objections he recognized and which he ig
nored.
11Plato recognizes that his demonstration is not quite
satisfactory.
He knows well how much distortion and violence
it includes, but he accepts this and waits that some one refutes
him; nobody has tried it as yet.11
( Etudes, p. 135)
Again one may recognize Renouvier's influence in this
appreciation of Plato's solution as deliberate choice.
The
s ame influence is recognizable at still another place, though
in this instance one must perhaps add the influence of Bro
chard' s friend and colleague Hamelin who, starting from
Renouvier's categories of representation, developed a new
idealistic system with features that are reminiscent of Fichte
and of Hegel.
Renouvier had stated that judgment is synthesis,
and synthesis was to become the symbol of the true philosophy.
Synthetical thinking as opposed to sterile analysis characterizes
a method which not only unfolds what is implied in a concept
but which, by dialectical progression; leads to new insights.
Brochard considers Plato's dialectics as synthetical in con
trast to Aristotle's syllogistics which is based on the prin.
ciple of identity.
But "the numerous objections of Aristotle
against the Platonic method must not make us fail to recognize
its originality and its boldness."
If Platonic dialectics includes ascent and descent, the
spiritualistic ( Augustinian ) interpretation seems to have been
mainly interested in the ascent which would ultimately lead
The syntehtic interpretation, on the other hand, tends
to God.
to emphasize the descending dialectics.
In spite of Brochard's break with the Augustinian
spiritualism, his interpretation of Plato has been called ·neo
pla tonic, and the critic who expressed this view was Emile
Br ehier.
No doubt, Brochard himself would have rejected that
epithet, as he considered Neo-platonism as the first in
trusion of oriental religious thinking into the philosophical
tradition of the West.
But although Brochard defended the in
dependence and the eternity of the ideas, he thought that the
theory of the participation provided a bridge between the ideas
;'
and the world of becoming, and he concluded, like Fouillee,
that in the end the chorismos between the two worlds would dis
"It
appear.
It belongs to the same context when he writes:
is one of the characteristic features of the Platonic method
that it everywhere multiplies the intermediaries, the middle


cSÎ KSªÎ µÎ ¡¦ISSKÎ ;oÁS}ÆÎ F¾µÎ SÃ¡};o«Î µc;µÎ ^¦Î $¦oªµµ}QÎ ÂQÎ
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 6dSÆÎ ;¦SÎ µlSÎ LS}«Î oÎ µcSÎ ¦KU¦Î `Î @boµ¾KSÎ x¾ªµÎ <ªÎ µcSÎ
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µcSÎ o^osµWÎ IºobXµÎ ;µS¦t;}Î µmob«Î SÁS¦Î ¦S«µÎ
:SµÎ µcS¦SÎ
o«Î ¦b;oÉ;µoÎ SÁSÎ <bÎ µdSÎ
6cS¦SÎ <¦SÎ µÂÎ |oKªÎ ^Î
oµS¨SKo;¦oS«Î ÂdoIfÎ Y;F}SÎ µdSÎ oKS;«Î µÎ o`}¾SISÎ µdSÎ ;µS¦o<}Î
Â¦}KÎ I;¾«;}}ÆÎ 6cSÎ µ¦;ª^¦;µoÎ `Î µcSÎ oKoÁo«oF}SÎ oµÎ µcSÎ
«¡;µu;}}ÆÎ KoÁo«oF}SÎ oªÎ SKo<µSKÎ FÆÎ µcSÎ ;µcS;µoI<}Î ¾FS¦ªÎ
;KÎ ;boµ¾KSªÎ
)¾µÎ µcS¦SÎ oªÎ ;µcS¦Î o¹S©SKo;¦ÆÎ ÂdoIcÎ <"Q¬Î
o»Î ¡««oF~SÎ `¦Î ¾«Î µÎ ¾KS¦«µ;KÎ cÂÎ µdSÎ ;µS¦o;}Î Â¦}KÎ
¦S«Sµ«Î <Î d;¦oIÎ Âc}SÎ ;KÎ o«Î ;IIS´«oFZÎ µÎ ¾¦Î ¡ÂS¦Î ^Î
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-11terms, and this to such an extent that it leads in a continuous
way from one part to another and ultimately includes everything.
Furthermore these intermediaries are traced bacl<: to the unity,
because they are all subject to a mathematics which preserves
11
the unity in the multiplicty by means of the proportion.
(Etudes, p. 52)
After Cousin, Brochard is the
As time does not
studies in France.
influence, I limit the discussion to
Auguste
his most eminent disciples:

second initiator of Platonic
permit 'GO follow up his
a few remarks on two of
Dies and Leon Robin.

Di�s devoted a long life to the study of Plato and be
came one of Plato's most competent interpreters.
Among the
1
followers of Brochard he was least attracted by the 1Neo
platonic 11 interpretations.
Dies, too, is fully aware of the sig
nificance of the participation or, as he also says, relation,
but the important point for him is that, due to the universality
of relation, none of the ideas (Forms) is isolated.
Besides,
the insistence on being qua participation must not make us
forget that there is also a discussion of being qua being.
The central concept in Plato's ontology is for Dies
<-�'V
which he interprets as fulness of being
and which appears to him Plato's purest expression of the
divine.
A faithful Catholic, Di�s is free from any dogmatic
prejudice.
He occasiori.ally refers to Pe'nelon and Malebranche,
bu'c not in order to approach Plato to Christianity.
Plato's
greatest merit lies for him in his fight against intellectual,
moral and political relativism.
That which is not relative is
divine and the most divine, for Plato, is being.
Plato did not
identify the divine with God who is ontologically later (but
did not emanate from it).
Plato prepared the path for
Christianity, but his philosophy is in important aspects differ
e1t from Christian thinking.
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In contrast to Dies, Leon Hobin continued the Neoplatonic trend which was present in Brochard and led it to its
climax.
What had been the desideratum since the appearance of
Ravaisson's work on Aristotle, the great monograph on Plato
seems to have been accomplished by Robin with his book Plato's
Theory of Ideas and Nurn1� according to Aristotle ( 190'81.
Robin is equally attached to Brochard and to Hamelin.
Philosophically, it is the latter1s concept of a synthetic
philosophy which exercised a formative influence on his
thinking.
Still Brochard, too, had made use of that concept;
he, too, had emphasized the descending dialectics and the
middle terms which, he thought, closed the gap between the ideas
and the things subject to becoming.
Ravaisson had drawn a picture of the Platonic philosophy
that was entirely derived from Aristotle's information about
Plato
Robin, in his great book, does exactly the same, though
•

.
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Toward the end of his book, Robin states his surprise
about the similarity of the picture of the Platonic philosophy
which results from his labor with that of the ancient Neo
But Neo-platonism appeared to be present already
platonists.
in Brochard, even though his Neo-Platonism had replaced the
Augustinian Neo-platonism of Cousin and the spirutualists.
Among.the authors that have been mentioned neither
Martin nor Di e s ascribed Nee-platonic views to Plato, and
Brochard's interpretations are too independent and too complex
Also it appeared that two philo
to fit any classification.
sophical movements, i.e. the German idealism and Renouvier's
nee-criticism initiated two distinct phases in French Plato
interpretation in the century from Cousin to Robin.
It is the
more surprising that Neo-platonism played such an important role
during the whole period.
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